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Abstract 
We have long known that public policy problems are “wicked” or complex. However, in order to 
make them manageable we have “reduced” them to fit linear Newtonian-Cartesian models. 
Recent advances in complexity theory have given us a conceptual framework, language, and 
models that provide us the capacity to implement alternative frameworks for studying wicked 
problems. After a brief overview of the relevance of complexity concepts to public policy 
analysis, we discuss the role of agent-based models as an enhanced policy analysis tool for 
dealing with the complexity of policy problems.   
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INTRODUCTION 
There is growing recognition of the limitations of traditional linear views and 
optimization methods in capturing the complex reality that is the subject of public administration, 
public policy analysis and management (Moss, 2002; Lempert, 2002; Henrickson & McKelvey, 
2002; Moss & Edmond, 2004). “No model less complex than the system itself can accurately 
predict in detail how the system will behave at future times” (Bankes, 2002, p. 7263). This 
methodological reinterpretation of Ashby’s principle of requisite variety (Ashby, 1957, pp. 206-
212) guides us in our reflection on current practice of policy analysis.   
While statistical and other modeling techniques have been extensively and successfully 
used in policy analysis, their shortcomings for policy analysis are well documented (Morçöl, 
2002; Fisher, 2003a). These shortcomings are closely related to the complexity of policy 
problems in the world of politics (Moe, 1989), competing values (Quinn, 1991), interdependency 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), and uncertainty (Stacey, 1992). For such problems, the classical 
approaches of predictive modeling and optimization have limited utility (Schön, 1983; Bankes, 
2002).  
In recent years, complexity science has made broad claims about its relevance for policy 
science.  However, much of these works lacks the full operationalization of complexity models 
as a useful tool for policy analysis. In this paper, we explore critiques of traditional policy 
analysis and discuss the nature of policy problems using the language of complexity. We also 
discuss agent-based modeling as a methodological supplement or enhancement to the tools and 
techniques commonly used for public policy analysis.   DRAFT 
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COMPLEXITY 
Complexity Science 
While its roots go much deeper (Goldstein, 1999; François, 1999), complexity science 
emerged as an academic activity in the 1970s, gathered momentum in the early 1980s, and was 
enveloped in controversy by the mid-1990s (Wilson, 1998). The multidisciplinary research in 
modern biology, physics, economics, and computer science initiated a renewed interest in 
complex systems. (Waldrop, 1992). From the outset, complexity science has relied on a process 
of gaining knowledge from shared ideas, methods, and experiences from diverse disciplines in 
order to understand the irreducible complexity of reality as a composite whole. According to 
Weaver (1948), the focus of applied physics, biology, medical science, psychology, economics, 
and political science is on ‘the problem of organized complexity.’ These problems “involve 
dealing simultaneously with a sizable number of factors which are interrelated into an organic 
whole” (Weaver, 1948, p. 539). The essential nature of complex systems implies that these areas 
may not be successfully understood when only a small number of variables are considered or 
explored by standard deterministic techniques.     
Complex systems are generally defined as dynamic systems that exhibit recognizable 
patterns of organization across spatial and temporal scales (Holland & Miller, 1991; Parker, et al., 
2003). Organizations and policy systems can also be understood as complex adaptive systems 
where several elements in society are dynamically and purposefully interrelated.
1 A  major 
interest of complexity science is the study of emergent phenomena in different complex systems 
and to recognize common patterns and underlying mechanisms.
2  Emergent behavior can not be 
predicted or necessarily envisioned from knowledge of the system’s constituent parts (Casti, DRAFT 
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1997). For instance, an atom does not have a temperature, but a collection of atoms does. Each 
molecule of sugar does not have the sweetness property, but as a whole it does. Similarly, there 
are no individuals in a mob, but mobs form and their spatio-temporal properties can be studied 
systematically. Therefore, it is the organization of the components that determines the emergent 
phenomena of complex systems.   
Simon (1996) discussed three important stages in complexity and complex systems and 
associated keywords within each stage (Table 1). 
<Table 1 Here> 
In each of these stages, complexity science shares the holistic view of the world that 
humans are part of a greater whole. This holistic understanding also reflects the frustration with 
the praxis of modern scientific knowledge and technical solutions. In particular, an essential 
tenet of social and policy science is the idea of social reform and progress. However, this idea is 
based on the unrealistic assumption of total predictability which has avoided dealing with 
unending complexity. These complex and wicked problems require a mediated approach so that 
yesterday’s solutions do not become today’s problems. Focusing on a single goal 
mischaracterizes the problems which are essentially multi-objective and subject to multiple 
constraints. The complex systems perspective holds the promise of an adaptive, intergrated 
approach to these problems and their contexts.   
 
Complexity of Policy Problems 
Scientists who subscribe to complexity view the world through a lens that is different 
from that of a traditional positivist (Morçöl, 2002; Baets, 2005). A fundamental assumption of 
the positivist paradigm is that even if we do not know reality in its entirety, it is not inherently DRAFT 
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unknowable. The role of science is to accumulate the knowledge necessary to make the reality 
predictable in this context. On the contrary, complexity acknowledges the limited ability of 
humans to comprehend the complexity of reality and therefore requires humble reflection on the 
current state of knowledge (Morçöl, 2002). “Our search is ultimately devoted not to a precise 
knowledge of the universe, but to a grasp of the role which we play in it – to the meaning of our 
life” (Jantsch, 1980, p. 310).   
This leads us to the debate on whether scientific knowledge should be verifiable and 
empirically testable in order to establish its objectivity or perhaps wonder whether scientific 
objectivity is something that policy science must pursue.
3  What does scientific objectivity mean 
in human and social affairs? One cannot see the world without the intervention of the physical 
senses. The world that one sees reflects the image of one’s sensory interpretation. Our nervous 
system brings forth a world in the process of cognition. The regularity of the world we 
experience at every moment is created each time by the neural capacity of the brain. Even if the 
world is out there, the world has no ‘essence’ to be discovered (Czarniawska, 1997). In that 
sense, interpretation, subjectivity, and social construction become an inevitable domain for 
policy analysis.   
Recent advances in complexity science have given us a framework and language for 
discussing such complexity. Below, we discuss some insights that complexity science provides 
to policy science, along with their critiques of traditional policy analysis.   
 
Actors and Interactions 
Complexity defines human beings and entities as situated within the environment that 
consists of other human beings and entities. They are depicted as adaptive, autonomous, and DRAFT 
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purposeful actors (Nohria, 1992). These actors are adaptive in that they are “guided by 
information from the environment, must control its essential variables, forcing them to go with 
the proper limits, by so manipulating the environment that the environment acts on them 
appropriately” (Ashby, 1952, p. 82). These actors are also autonomous. They are “situated within 
a part of an environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its 
own agenda and so as to affect what it senses in the future” (Franklin & Graesser, 1997, p. 18). 
Further, these actors are purposive in that they “deal with conscious decisions or adaptations in 
the pursuit of goals within the limits of their information and their comprehension of how to 
navigate through their environment toward whatever their objectives are” (Schelling, 1978, p. 
18). Therefore, the behavior of these actors is much more complex than physical particles. 
Human behavior does not usually permit any simple summation or extrapolation to the aggregate 
(Schelling, 1978). 
  Traditional policy analysis has implicitly subscribed to the assumption of rational 
human-beings and mechanistic entities within a de-contextualized situation.
4 Periodicity  and 
generalization play an important role in this approach. Thus, a logical consequence of this 
approach is to seek the best alternatives and best solutions. From the perspective of complexity, 
the world is not a collection of isolated rational objects, but a representation of a network of 
autonomous and purposeful actors who are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent. 
Understanding human beings and entities as adaptive, autonomous, and purposeful actors 
highlights the limitation of the traditional view and also acknowledges the importance of the 
distinction between natural laws and social rules. 
Living systems are partially reacting to action due to history, context, and randomness. 
Change is an inevitable component of living systems. The notion of fundamental laws in human DRAFT 
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and social systems may be neither feasible nor desirable.
5  The concept of social laws must be 
interpreted differently than natural laws. “While behavior in the physical domain is governed by 
cause and effect (laws of nature), behavior in the social domain is governed by rules generated 
by the social system and often codified into law” (Capra, 1996, p. 211). Social laws are not 
immutable. They need to be seen as general explanatory statements.
6  This view shifts our 
conceptual interest from rational objects to the interaction and interdependency among 
autonomous and purposeful actors in order to refine social rules related to complex human 
behavior. In other words, human behavior can be perceived as communication. A message is a 
single unit of communication. A series of messages exchanged among people is called 
interaction. The higher level of human communication is a pattern of interaction (Watzlawick, 
Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967). While social rules are designed to deal with certain patterns of 
human interactions, this theoretical base of social rules has not been properly incorporated in 
traditional policy analysis. Complexity and human interactions were assumed away in many 
policy analyses for the purpose of simplicity.     
 
Knowledge and Learning 
Complexity shows that systems or processes should not be frozen and need to stay 
somewhere between too much and too little order. At the ‘edge of chaos’ where complexity 
exists, human creativity and innovation can thrive.
7  Uncertainty is at the heart of creativity.
8 
This provides a perspective on two key components in human understanding and actions, 
knowledge
9  and learning. Is knowledge a transferable commodity or process? Can interpretation 
be knowledge? Can knowledge exist independent of the human being who uses it, learns it, and DRAFT 
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transfers it? How should we understand learning in organizations or learning organizations? 
What does it mean for analysis? 
Knowledge is not something that exists independently from human beings or something 
that can simply be stored as substance or a framework. Knowledge is seen as an endless process 
and praxis. There is little use of knowledge in a theoretical framework if it is of no use in the 
dynamic world. The pragmatics of knowledge emphasizes the relation of signs to users in a 
context,
10  and behavior can only be studied in the given context. The meaning of the behavior 
pertains to the context at a certain time. Therefore, the context, dynamic world in which one lives 
redefines one’s knowledge at every moment. 
When environments are stable, standards and procedures are valued. Well-defined 
hierarchy and neutral bureaucracies are highly regarded. Uncertainty and errors are considered as 
something to be eliminated. When the environment is rapidly changing and uncertainty prevails, 
creativity and learning are vital for dealing with complexity. One must be free to reflect on 
perplexity, confusion, or doubt in order to acquire learning. From this learning process, they 
become reflective practitioners (Schön, 1983) and reflexive practitioners (Cunliffe & Jun, 2005). 
There is no room for knowledge and learning if all aspects of social activities are pre-specified or 
pre-determined. Knowledge and learning are crucial to understanding adaptive, autonomous, and 
purposeful  actors.   
Organizations that embrace complexity are living (de Geus, 1987) and learning entities 
(Senge, 1990; Michael, 1997
11). These organizations value openness and flexibility. They 
embrace uncertainty and error as learning opportunities. For example, it is suggested that 
organizations focus on recognizing patterns and building networks to amplify positive feedback 
rather than trying to achieve optimal performance at all times. In analysis, therefore, an optimal DRAFT 
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policy based on a best estimate model may not be robust across the range of possible behaviors 
of complex adaptive systems (Bankes, 2002). These analyses oversimplify issues and limit 
learning opportunities.   
Further, depending upon whether one observes the issues from inside or outside a 
particular system, the quality of understanding and description are significantly different.
12 
When one is part of the system, trial and error, adjustment, and change of one’s thoughts and 
actions become crucial ingredients for better decision-making. Analyses from outside the system 
may not fully capture the complexity with which these organizations deal.   
 
Process and Emergence 
It has been implicitly believed that the basic process of nature is deterministic and 
reversible. Once the particular state of a system is measured, the reversible laws are supposed to 
determine its future. Therefore, the emphasis of the studies is on time-independent laws. This 
concept of the simple world governed by time-reversible fundamental laws has been questioned 
(Pierce, 1961; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Reversibility and determinism may apply only to 
limiting and simple cases. Data, processes, and issues are dependent upon their epoch and upon 
the forms of process dominant in the time. Irreversibility and randomness are rules in nature and 
lie at the origin of most processes of self-organization (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984).   
Traditional policy science as a search for simplicity contributed to our understanding of 
policy-making. Nevertheless, there is a need for comprehending the nature of complexity to 
improve policy processes. Public policy can be seen as an emergent phenomenon (Morçöl, 2003). 
During implementation, policy is interpreted and enacted based upon the interpretation. Public 
policy is not reducible to the original intentions of its initiators or the text of the law. Once it DRAFT 
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emerges, public policy does not stay the same, but it constantly evolves. This revisit of 
‘implementation as evolution’
13  is rooted in the philosophical tradition of Heraclitus who 
realized that one cannot step twice into the same river. 
Advances in modern science such as chaos theory and quantum physics have provided 
examples that show that one cannot forecast the future based on the past. Two versions of the 
impossibility of prediction with certainty are found in the literature. One version starts from 
Poincaré, who said that small differences in the initial conditions generate very large differences 
in the final phenomena (Merton, 1936; Lorenz, 1964; Baets, 2005). The other version is from 
Gell-Mann (1994), who stated that even in the classical limit and even when the laws and initial 
conditions are exactly specified, indeterminacy can still be introduced by any ignorance of 
previous history… whereby future outcomes are arbitrarily sensitive to tiny changes in present 
conditions. This implies that there is not always a best solution. Best principles might provide 
better insights for policy design. 
The evolving nature and emergent property of public policy makes us reflect on current 
practices of policy evaluation and evaluation methods. The causal relationship in nature is 
considered to be a scientific achievement. The relationship between social programs and 
outcomes may not be the same because programs and outcomes co-evolve. Even if the causal 
relationship between a program and an outcome was present at one time, the relationship might 
be true only in the given time and under the assumption that the context was fully considered. 
However, we still do not know how to fully include contextual complexity in our studies.   
Therefore, some argue that instead of searching for causality, the concept of 
synchronicity may provide better insights into business dynamics (Peat, 1987, 2002; Baets, 
2005). Synchronicity refers to ‘meaningful coincidence, significantly related patterns of chance,’ DRAFT 
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(Peat, 1987) or ‘being together in time’ (Baets, 2005). The notion of synchronicity has its roots 
in Flatland (Abbott, 1963; Stewart, 2001) where complex objects that fall through flatland “may 
look like a correlated series of events that are separated in space” (Peat, 1987, pp. 116-117). 
Normal events in the three-dimensional world may look like synchronicities in the flat world of 
two dimensions. One may not be able to draw the whole picture of the complex object at this 
moment, but one can still catch and follow the flow at the moment of synchronicity. This alludes 
to the idea that business and organizational performance may be improved by learning how to 
take opportunities when synchronicity is presented, even if one can not draw the whole picture. 
The practice of policy analysis is still under the influence of positivism (Durning, 1999; 
Fischer, 2003b). However, a massive paradigm shift has conceptually been noticed. This shift 
implies changes in our world view, from a simple to a probabilistic world, from hierarchy to 
heterarchy, from mechanistic to holographic universe, from deterministic to indeterministic view, 
from direct to mutual causality such as symbiosis and nonlinearity, from metaphor of assembly 
to morphogenesis (creation of new forms), and from pure objectivity to perspectival (Lincoln, 
2005). The basic assumptions in complexity are well aligned with the changing world view. The 
complexity views are compared with the traditional positivistic approach (Table 2).   
<Table 2 Here> 
 
MANAGING COMPLEXITY 
Over the past few decades, alternatives to the positivist approach have been making 
some inroads. For example, there has been an effort to understand the argumentative and 
narrative nature of policy analysis (Fischer & Forester, 1993). What policy analysts do is to 
provide policy arguments. This argument is not separated from value judgments and is used by DRAFT 
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policy makers during public debates. Methods and conditions to improve policy debate and 
discourse are more important than objective measures (Majone, 1989).   
While these perspectives are intellectually stimulating, their applicability in policy 
analysis remains unclear. How can we use some of these ideas on evaluating public programs 
and processes? We know how to measure efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity within the 
framework of traditional policy analysis. However, we do not have many clues regarding how to 
model complexity and design our future in this uncertain world in order to eventually improve 
future performance.   
 
Social Complexity and Algorithms 
In its most simplistic form, complexity science searches for algorithmic rules that can 
represent complex patterns in reality. Algorithms are a set of simple rules that repeat over and 
over again (Peat, 2002). Mandelbrot (1997) has shown that algorithms can produce ‘fractals’
14 
which are scale-free self-organizing complex patterns in nature. Fractal geometry shows that 
seemingly complicated shapes and patterns can arise from simple and humble beginnings. 
Coastlines, clouds, and trees are physical examples of fractals. These natural shapes display self-
similarity on many scales. They are made up of many smaller copies of themselves (Stewart, 
2001). In other words, each part of a shape is geometrically similar to the whole. Although it 
may not be true for all patterns, simple mathematical rules can lead to such complicated patterns. 
When we do not know whether there are any underlying rules, patterns will help us to look into 
them because they are not just a random mess (Mandelbrot, 1977; Grimm, et al., 2005). 
 DRAFT 
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“Patterns are observations of any kind showing nonrandom structure and therefore 
containing information on the mechanisms from which they emerge.” (Grimm, et 
al., 2005, p. 991) 
 
The notion of fractals may not be limited to nature. We can also draw an analogy of 
fractals for social complexity. For example, collaboration, coordination, and diffusion present 
enough complexities and irregularities. Nevertheless, certain mechanisms can be found in these 
behaviors (Axelrod, 1984, 1997b). For example, the traditional notion of organization has been 
presented as a black box that has complex impersonal relationships and standardized procedures 
mainly in a hierarchical structure. Recent studies are opening the black box with relatively 
simple mechanisms such as ‘Sense-and-Respond’ (Haeckel, 1999) and ‘Request-Execution-
Delivery’ (Ramanathan, 2005). Organizations are made up of self-similar copies of these 
mechanisms on many scales. These mechanisms are important to our understanding of the 
complexity of global supply chains and health service delivery systems.
15  
 
Computational Social Science Models 
Computational social science models are being developed to simulate social complexity 
using computer algorithms. The original ideas of computational models for social complexity 
can be found in Weiner (1948, 1954), Ashby (1952, 1957), Newell & Simon (1972), and Simon 
(1996). In cybernetics, it is assumed that human cognition is not different from information 
processing in computers. Human cognition works through the manipulation of symbols based on 
a set of rules. Communication is a transmission of information. This simplistic view of humans DRAFT 
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has been criticized by biologists in the 1970s (Capra, 1996). Whether human cognition can be 
duplicated by a computing machine is still in question (Dreyfus, 1972; Casti, 1997).     
Newell & Simon (1972) further extended the idea of cybernetics for studying human 
problem solving. When they explored how integrated activities constitute problem solving in 
such tasks as chess and puzzles, information processing theory provided a foundation of their 
understanding of what symbols and symbol manipulation can do for us. Later, Simon (1996) 
distinguished three important components of ‘the artificial’ and specified their relationships. The 
three components are: the purpose (goal), the character of the artifact (inner environment), and 
the environment in which the artifact performs (outer environment). In Simon’s (1996) 
framework, social complexity is a result of the adaptive interaction between the artifact and its 
outer environment, rather than from some inner complexity within the artifact.   
 
“Human beings, viewed as behaving systems, are quite simple. The apparent 
complexity of our behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of 
the environment in which we find ourselves.” (Simon, 1996, p. 53) 
 
This idea known as Simon’s Conjecture is the basis of the epistemology of computational 
social science (Cioffi-Revilla, et al., 2004). This conjecture allows us to anticipate certain 
behaviors from the knowledge of goals and its outer environment, even when there is minimal 
knowledge of the inner environment, such as physical properties and characters of the artifact. 
For instance, uneven traffic flow as collective behavior emerges, mainly due to the complexity of 
the environment, such as random positioning, signals, and distance between cars (Resnick, 1994), 
rather than the capacity of the engines, models, and types of the cars. If the organization of some DRAFT 
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components, rather than their properties, largely explains social complexity, the consequences of 
alternative organizational assumptions for human behavior can be explored using computer 
agents. The computer agents are organized somewhat in the image of man by having properties 
and showing certain behaviors (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1996). The behavioral 
assumptions can be codified into a set of algorithmic rules.   
Complexity is a multidisciplinary science. It takes into consideration elements of very 
different disciplines, such as cybernetics, systems theory, chaos theory, artificial intelligence, 
artificial life, cognitive sciences, computer science, ecology, economy, evolutionary biology, 
game theory, linguistics, philosophy, social sciences, and management. In this paper, the notion 
of complexity in many areas is simplified with fractals. Certainly, social complexity belongs to, 
overlaps, and goes beyond complex patterns in nature. As several complexity models have been 
developed and introduced, there has been an effort to simulate social complexity using 
computational models. In many cases, they aim to understand and model values, interactions, 
uncertainty, learning, process, and emergence in social complexity using the simulation models 
(Figure 1). 
<Figure 1 Here> 
 
Development of Agent-Based Models 
Agent-based modeling is a recently emerging technique within the tradition of 
computational social science models. Complexity models, computational models, and agent-
based models are the same in that they codify organizational assumptions as computer programs 
(algorithms), and the inference is performed by executing the program (Edmond, 2001). 
Complexity models are a synonym of complexity science, and they are not separable from each DRAFT 
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other. Computational models are given explicitly in mathematical terms or implicitly by coding 
the relationships among the variables and rules constituting a computer program (Casti, 1997). 
An agent-based model is a computational model in that it implicitly codes the interdependency of 
agents and action rules using symbols of programming language.   
However, agent-based models are different from classical simulation models. Macro-
simulation in the 1960s used sets of differential equations for macro-level forecasting. Micro-
simulation in the 1970s used the individual as the unit of analysis for macro-level forecasting. 
However, individuals do not directly interact or adapt in these simulations (Marcy & Willer, 
2002). The basic variables determining the outcome of decisions are aggregated quantities rather 
than the actions of individuals (Casti, 1997). By making agents behave based on their own 
properties and interaction rules, users of agent-based models are more interested in theoretical 
bridges between micro- and macro-levels and in gaining insights than in mathematical solutions.   
 
Characteristics of Agent-Based Models 
Agent-based models go beyond deductive analysis of closed systems to provide 
interactive analytic support for inductive reasoning about open systems (Bankes, 2002). Agent-
based models can be implemented as a method of exploring complex problems. The advantages 
of agent-based models include the ability to accommodate various differences among individuals, 
to simulate complex decision-making by an individual, and to address interactions over time and 
space (Gimblett, 2002). Repetitive competitive interactions among agents are a feature of agent-
based models. Even a simple agent-based model can exhibit complex behavior patterns and 
provide valuable information about the dynamics of the real-world system that it emulates 
(Epstein & Axtell, 1996). Agents may be capable of evolving and allowing unanticipated DRAFT 
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behaviors to emerge. Sophisticated agent-based models sometimes incorporate neural networks, 
evolutionary algorithms, or other learning techniques to allow realistic learning and adaptation 
(Bonabeau, 2002).   
Agent-based models consist of agents and action rules. Agents are the basic unit of 
action in simulations and are specified by defining the complex system studied and specifying 
the interdependency of system components. Agents can be humans, institutions, robots, 
computers, objects, concepts, and even ants. They are heterogeneous and autonomous with 
behavior that can be rational, adaptive, and random in response to the environment. Learning 
occurs through the adaptive behavior (Ashby, 1952) and thus influences future decisions. Action 
rules reflect organizational assumptions in complex systems. The rules specify how the agents 
interact. Flexibility in designing new action rules in a simulation allows researchers to test 
alternative assumptions underlying complex social phenomena in the simulated reality (Resnick, 
1994; Simon, 1996; Marcy & Willer, 2002).     
Above all, agent-based models aim to enrich our understanding of fundamental 
processes that may appear in a variety of systems and to support our intuition on the target 
system (Axelrod, 1997a; Edmonds, 2001). Once patterns and processes are modeled as a 
dynamic system, it is possible to test some options for purposeful actions. This will allow us to 
approach complex issues with the awareness of consequences. Figure 2 presents a 
methodological framework within which agent-based models can be implemented. This figure is 
an adaptation of Drogoul & Ferber’s representation (1994, p.134) that contrasts classical 
stochastic simulation models and agent-based models (James, 1996; Maturana & Varela, 1987; 
Lash, 1990; Mingers, 1995). Encompassing patterns and process this comprehensive framework DRAFT 
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shows that agent-based models can incorporate traditional research models within a set of 
realistic assumptions. 
<Figure 2 Here> 
 
Illustration and Examples 
Agent-based models have been used for many purposes, such as modeling emergence 
(Holland, 1998), catastrophic phenomena, far-from equilibrium behaviors (Bak, 1991, 1996), 
constructivist learning and challenging assumptions (Resnick, 1994), virtual laboratories (Casti, 
1997), technological or engineering applications, and planning.    Here three policy-relevant 
examples for which agent-based models were used are presented: Schelling’s segregation, 
Axelrod’s computer games, and an artificial world to address traffic congestion.   
Schelling’s segregation model (1978) represents one of the first constructive models of a 
dynamic system that is capable of self-organization based on simple rules. In this segregation 
model an agent is a cell surrounded by other cells. A cell changes color or remains unchanged 
depending upon the characteristics of their neighbors’ colors. In Figure 3, the simulation shows 
that initial random agents that a computer generated (left figure) segregated after a certain time 
(right figure). Agents were represented using each cell with two different colors. Neighbor cells 
are environments of agents. The action rule used in the simulation is as follows: “an [blue or red] 
agent decides whether it wants to move. It scans all of the neighbors and sums the total number 
of similar agents. If the sum is below the threshold, then it moves.” The simulation did not 
specify detailed properties of the agents other than their colors and the action rule. Yet, the 
simulation arrives at a segregated equilibrium. This example illustrates an utility of agent-based 
models for thought experiment or theory testing.   DRAFT 
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<Figure 3 Here> 
In their early stages, some modelers presented complexity without altering the rigid 
assumptions on agents (Axelrod, 1984; Axtell, 1999). Later, their interests were broadened to 
organizations and social systems. This resulted in relaxed assumptions regarding rationality 
(Axelrod, 1997b; Axelrod & Cohen, 2000). For example, Axelrod (1984) studied under what 
conditions cooperation will emerge when egoists compete in a game without central authority. 
The study showed that the norm of reciprocity made it possible for cooperation to emerge 
(Axelrod, 1984). In other words, cooperation emerges because of the possibility that the players 
will meet again even when the assumption of self-interested rational agents is not abandoned. In 
a later study on the emergence of norms as solutions to dilemma of collective action, Axelrod 
(1997b) chose to implement an evolutionary approach. In this simulation, the initial strategies are 
chosen at random, and strategies also undergo some random mutation. Agents no longer need to 
be rational. Players are given the opportunity to defect and to punish the defections they observe. 
The study identified ‘metanorm’ (the treatment of non-punishment as if it were another form of 
defection) as a mechanism that could sustain a partially established norm. This example shows 
an applicability of agent-based models for studying traditional social science topics.   
  If the former focuses on understanding the underlying processes of social phenomena, 
there are also examples of artificial worlds. Many policy problems require intervention. However, 
scientific, repeatable, and controllable tests on human subjects are not easy due to ethical, 
theoretical, and practical issues. Artificial worlds can be a laboratory for testing policy 
interventions. Chris Barrett at Los Alamos built TRANSIMS in order to tackle Christmas-
shopping congestion on Louisiana Boulevard in Albuquerque, New Mexico (Casti, 1997, pp. 
131-142). The main questions in the simulation were how a proposed change in the system DRAFT 
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creates traffic patterns and how these patterns impact the environment. The structure of the 
artificial world consists of travel demand and transport system data, trip route plan generation, 
traffic micro-simulation, and environmental simulation.   
 
DeliverySim: The Dynamics of Public Performance Management 
The other area that ABM has not been frequently utilized, but has enormous potential is 
public performance management. The current approach of performance management is to 
examine who performs better, why they perform better than others, and what are imperatives of 
high performance organizations. The complexity and dynamics of public management has not 
been a major concern to this approach, thus provides limited insights on the complex reality of 
public  performance  management.   
In exploring the dynamics of public performance management, dynamic systems 
theories provide rich theoretical foundation. For example, human ecology has explored the 
mutual influence of humans and environments and their adaptive strategies. The properties of 
complex adaptive systems - irreversibility, coevolution, and synchronicity - provide a fertile area 
for discussion with regards to performance management. These dynamic systems theories lead us 
to pay attention on the temporal organization of necessary components and conditions to 
understanding the dynamics of public performance. There have been a few conceptual 
applications of dynamic systems theory to management (Dörner, 1989; Kiel, 1994; Quinn, 1991). 
Built upon their works, we test a research hypothesis on public performance management. The 
productivity/quality double helix hypothesis suggests that at times productivity and quality will 
converge and diverge (Kiel, 1994). As managers strive to produce better results in both areas, 
one element may lag as another improves. In an effort to redirect the current interest of public DRAFT 
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performance management from ‘who and why’ to ‘when, where, and how’, we built an agent-
based model, DeliverySim.  
DeliverySim consist of two elements: (1) Agents: Three different agents are developed in 
the system of public service delivery. The “client” agent is public service recipients who are 
supposed to be satisfied by consuming public services. The “local” agent represents local 
agencies that are responsible for actual service delivery. The “state” agent develops policy and 
work process as well as monitor overall flow in the system. (2) Action Rules: We have two basic 
rules: First, we modeled the way that participant agents select the local agents using the Huff 
spatial interaction model (1964) and communication with neighbors. Second, we modeled how 
participant agents make decisions on whether they will stay or leave for the search of other local 
agents by comparing their expectation with the quality of the local agent chosen. The interaction 
among agents allows the state of agents to coevolve. The state of agents and their decision at 
time t influence future states ( ) , (
1 t
agent
t
agent
t
agent D S f S =
+ ), where S represents state of agents and D 
represents decisions made at time t. The field of action is defined by the nature of the work (e.g. 
public service delivery programs). Public performance is measured using productivity and 
quality. Being consistent with traditional definitions, productivity (P) is defined 
as
t
local
t
local
t
local I O P / = , where O is outputs, and I is inputs. Quality (Q) is defined as an arithmetic 
mean score of clients’ satisfaction for service delivery in the field over time. 
We present our preliminary results of DeliverySim in Figure 4 and Figure 5. In Figure 
4(a) we recited Kiel’s quality/productivity double helix hypothesis (1994, p. 143); whereas the 
replication of the double helix in our DeliverySim was presented in Figure 4(b). In Figure 5, we 
examined the performance of “local” agents in terms of quality and productivity as well as 
customer satisfaction of “participant” agents over time.   DRAFT 
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<Figure 4 Here> 
<Figure 5 Here> 
  Our next question is how to balance these competing values in public performance 
management under the different conditions. We would like to test the impact of different 
resources allocation strategies based on their performance and its impact to the system and their 
future performance. Ultimately, our goal is to run the simulation with empirical data and to 
provide context relevant policy recommendations.   
 
Some Perspectives on Policy Modeling 
The conceptual basis and models of complexity are discussed for policy analysis. Based 
on this discussion, we draw some perspectives on policy modeling. Traditional policy analysis 
has been effective in identifying measurable factors that exhibit regular patterns at a certain time 
and in a given context. However, many of the underlying processes that give rise to such patterns 
are unknown. Conventional research methods and tools have limited utility in studying such 
unknown processes. For example, statistical tools are built on the principle that one can make 
inferences about a population based on samples. Statistical analysis presents inductive and 
historical facts with assumptions specific to statistical techniques and data rather than processes. 
Economic models and techniques are built upon the basic assumptions of economics. The 
relationships identified using economic theories or tools do not necessarily mean that the process 
leading to the relationship is based on the underlying assumptions. Linear programming is 
genuinely solution-oriented in a given context. As the conditions change, the solutions change. 
What does not change is the assumption underlying this tool, which is to seek optimal solutions DRAFT 
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subject to certain conditions. By selecting an analytical tool, one implicitly subscribes to the 
values on which the tool is based. Understanding the process may reveal much richer stories and 
make individuals reflect on the underlying assumptions.   
Given that policy analysis requires substantial contextual knowledge as well as scientific 
knowledge for conscious action, policy analysis tools need to be flexible in incorporating 
contextual knowledge in many different policy settings. In other words, policy analysts must 
build testable models to represent the patterns they observe, and these models must be 
continuously revised until they align with the observed pattern. Multiple theories and 
assumptions need to be tested in the process of modeling. This process will improve the analyst’s 
own understanding of the reality as well as its representation for others. Therefore, it provides a 
chance for policy analysts to reflect on what they believe, what they value, and what they do. 
A crucial aspect of policy analysis is to inform practice even when only partial 
knowledge exists (Murray, 1983). Policy and decision-making cannot be delayed until social 
science is able to explain all social processes (Moore, 2002). Policy questions do not necessarily 
go together with analytic questions in a discipline. The fact that there are different views and 
values surrounding policy and decision-making should not discourage people about the role of 
policy analysis. It only implies that there is a need for an enhanced analytic and synthetic 
approach that can incorporate different interests and values into the policy analysis. It must be 
able to evaluate evidence within a larger spectrum of experience through analysis so as to 
facilitate dialogue among stakeholders. DRAFT 
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CONCLUSIONS 
There have been a number of studies on complexity and management (Stacey, 1996, 
2000; Amin & Hausner, 1997; Rosenhead, 1998; Battram, 1999; Sanderson, 2002; Baets, 2005), 
but there has been limited work on modeling complexity for policy analysis and decision support. 
The prominence of agent-based models is not limited to the fact that they can implement what 
the traditional approach has successfully addressed. These models can also serve to explore the 
implications of imperfect rationality (bounded rationality), the effects of learning, and social 
structure. While these aspects of human and social systems have been well acknowledged in the 
literature,
16  it is only recently that scholars are able to develop operational models.
17  
Early simulation and modeling had difficulties finding the right agents and describing 
the interactions among these agents (Casti, 1997), as well in modeling emergence and surprise. 
However, many of these obstacles are being overcome with the recent advance of technology 
and the progress in various disciplines. Today, one can create artificial worlds. They can conduct 
repeatable scientific experiments on complex systems. They can even address the consequences 
of a policy intervention. It seems that we are ever closer to ‘the sciences of the artificial’ (Simon, 
1996). This is the right time to bring up this advance in modeling and advantages for the policy 
community so as to enrich policy analysis.     
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NOTES 
1  There have been a number of theoretical studies, which argues the applicability of complex sciences in 
the field of policy, management, and organizations. This includes, but is not limited to, the application 
of chaos and complexity theory for public management (Kiel, 1994), management (Battram, 1999), 
governance (Amin & Hausner, 1997), knowledge management (Baets, 2005), organization (Stacey, 
1996), policy evaluation (Sanderson, 2002), and health service delivery organization (Kernick, 2004).   
2  Several efforts have been documented by scholars in different areas. Examples can be found from Casti 
(1989), Bak (1996), Wilson (1998), Auyang (1999), Buchanan (2002), and Barabasi, (2003). 
3  The objectivity of scientific knowledge is not a settled issue. For example, see Oreskes, Shrader-
Frechette, & Belitz (1994) for discussion in natural science and Moore (1983, 2002), Vickers (1970), 
and Ackoff (1999) in social and policy science. They provide equally good discussions on the limitation 
of such a concept of objectivity for scientific knowledge. Epistemology based on biology has provided a 
strong foundation on such an understanding. See Bronowski (1978), Maturana & Varela (1987), Dyke 
(1988), and Hawkins & Blakeslee (2004). Also, see Casti (1989) and Popper (2002) for the issue 
approached from the philosophy of science. 
4  One of most recent books on this topic is Talbot (2005).   
5  Vickers (1970) argued that “the only reason why men are by and large more predictable than the 
weather is that they are concerned to be predictable; concern to meet each other’s expectations by 
accepting common self-expectations. Also, the web of mutual expectations creates an order of which the 
regularities obey neither general nor statistical laws. The order is created rather than discovered, 
imposed rather than induced” (p.101). 
6  For discussion on the difference between natural laws and social rules, see Hon (1999), Capra (1996), 
and Conte, Hegselmann, & Terna (1997). Hon’s discussion (1999) is particularly concise and insightful. DRAFT 
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7  See Waldrop (1992) and Lewin (1992) for the ‘edge of chaos’ and McMaster (1996), Stacey, Griffin, & 
Shaw (2000) and Desai (2005) for the applications of the concept in management.   
8  Biology has provided a foundation on such a view. See Jacob (1982) and Maturana & Varela (1987). 
9  For discussion on knowledge from the complexity perspective, see Rescher (1996) and Baets (2005). 
10  A long tradition of such a view is found from Morris (1938), Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson (1967), 
and Maier, Hadrich, & Peinl (2005). 
11  First edition was published in 1973. The second edition is cited here. 
12  This argument is found in critiques of traditional system and management theories (Senge, 1990; 
Stacey, Griffin, & Shaw, 2000), and in discussions of relativity in physics (Casti, 1997). 
13  Majone & Wildavsky (1973). This paper was republished in Public policy: The essential readings 
edited by Theodoulou & Cahn (1995). 
14  Mandelbrot (1977) coined ‘fractals’ from Latin adjective, fractus, and verb, frangere, which means to 
‘break’ to create irregular fragments (p.4). 
15  Communications of the ACM (the Association of Computing Machinery) published a special issue on 
adaptive complex enterprises in May 2005. See Jones & Deshmukh (2005) for the application of 
complexity to supply chain management and Tan, Wen, & Awad (2005) for the application of chaos 
theory to health service delivery. 
16  There is no shortage of this understanding in organization literature (Simon, 1955; Argyris & Schön, 
1974; Schön, 1983, Senge, 1990; Michael, 1997). 
17  Many of the methodological papers have recently been published (Axelrod, 1984, 1997b; Gilbert & 
Troitzsch, 1999; Bank, 2002; Lempert, Popper, & Bankes, 2004). 
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Figure 1: Modeling social complexity to inform policy decisions   
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Figure 2: Methodological framework – the smaller box inside the larger box presents the 
relationship between patterns in reality and their representation using a mathematical formula 
that has been a general framework in the traditional approach. The larger box presents the 
framework of agent-based models. Often agent-based models aim to replicate the representation 
of the reality or one’s understanding of reality rather than the reality itself. These multiple 
representations are achieved by assuming multiple realities and multiple behaviors of agents at 
micro levels. The model assumes that their dynamic nonlinear interactions self-organize to create 
certain patterns at macro levels. This also allows to project future patterns based on the nonlinear 
interactions among heterogeneous agents. 
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Figure 3: Schelling's segregation model was conceptually introduced in his Micromotives and 
Macrobehavior (1978). The simulation was implemented in MASON version 10.0. DRAFT 
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(a) Productivity/Quality Double Helix Hypothesis  (b) A replication of the double helix 
 
 
Figure 4: The Productivity/Quality double helix hypothesis by Kiel, 1994, p. 143 and a 
replication of the double helix by DeliverySim. 
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Figure 5: Simulating Quality vs. Productivity Trade-off and Customer Satisfaction vs. 
Productivity Trade-off using DeliverySim. 
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Table 1: Keywords in three distinct stages of complexity   
 
Period Keywords 
Between World War I & II      Holism, Gestalt, Creative Evolution 
After World War II  Information, Feedback, Cybernetics, General Systems 
Now  Chaos, Complex Adaptive Systems, Genetic Algorithms, 
Cellular Automata 
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Table 2: Basic assumptions of traditional positivistic approach and complexity   
 
  Positivistic Approach  Complexity Approach 
Goal Mastering  nature  Conversation with nature (Jantsch, 1975; 
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) 
Ontology  Substance  Process (Rescher, 1996, 2000) 
Assumption Independence  / 
Invariance,  
Connectedness (Whitehead, 1938, 1978; 
Bronowski, 1978; Bateson, 2002),   
  Reversible  Irreversible (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) 
Search  General Law  Principles or Rules (Hon, 1999),   
 Causality  Synchronicity  (Peat, 1987; Baets, 2005) 
Models  To Predict  To Anticipate (Holland, 1998) or understand 
 
 